Abstract-A supermarket game is considered with N FCFS queues with unit exponential service rate and global Poisson arrival rate Nλ. Upon arrival each customer chooses a number of queues to be sampled uniformly at random and joins the least loaded sampled queue. Customers are assumed to have cost for both waiting and sampling, and they want to minimize their own expected total cost. We study the supermarket game in a mean field model that corresponds to the limit as N converges to infinity in the sense that (i) for a fixed symmetric customer strategy, the joint equilibrium distribution of any fixed number of queues converges as N → ∞ to a product distribution determined by the mean field model and (ii) a Nash equilibrium for the mean field model is an -Nash equilibrium for the finite N model with N sufficiently large. It is shown that there always exists a Nash equilibrium for λ < 1 and the Nash equilibrium is unique for λ 2 ≤ 1/2. Furthermore, we find that the action of sampling more queues by some customers has a positive externality on the other customers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a stream of customers arriving to a multi-server system where any server is capable of serving any customer. Upon arrival, customers are unaware of the current queue length at servers, so they sample a few servers and join the server with the shortest queue among the sampled few. Customers have time cost proportional to the waiting time at servers and sampling cost proportional to the number of sampled servers. Customers are self-interested and aim to minimize their own total cost by choosing the optimal number of servers to sample. Note that the waiting time of a customer depends on the other customers' choices, so it is a game among the customers and we call it the supermarket game, because often in supermarkets customers try to find counters with short queue to check out.
A. Motivation
The supermarket game is a simple model for analyzing distributed load balancing in transportation and communication networks. Load balancing ensures efficient resource utilization and improves the quality of service, by evenly distributing the workload across multiple servers. Traditionally, load balancing is fulfilled by a central dispatcher that assigns the newly arriving work to the server with the least workload. As modern or future networks become larger and increasingly distributed, such central dispatcher may not exist, and thus the load balancing has to be carried out by customers themselves. Hence, the supermarket game is relevant in scenarios where (1) customers choose which server to join without directions from a central dispatcher or tracker; (2) global workload or queue length information is not available and customers randomly choose a finite number of servers to probe; (3) there is cost associated with probing a server and waiting in a queue.
Examples of such scenarios are the following:
• Network routing: customers represent traffic flows and servers represent possible routes from a given source to a destination. A traffic flow can find the route with low delay by probing different routes.
• Dynamic wireless spectrum access: customers represent wireless devices and servers represent all the shared spectrum. The wireless devices can find the spectrum band with low interference and congestion by probing multiple spectrum bands.
• Cloud computing service: customers can decide how many servers to probe in seeking the server with low delay. In this paper, we address the following natural questions for these systems: How many servers will a self-interested customer sample? Is sampling or probing more servers by some customers beneficial or detrimental to the others?
B. Main Results
The supermarket game with finite number of servers is difficult to analyze due to the correlation among queues at different servers. Therefore, we study the supermarket game in a mean field model that corresponds to the limit as the number of servers converges to infinity. With unit exponential service rate at servers and Poisson arrival of customers, it is shown that:
• There exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for all arrival rates per server less than one.
• The action of sampling more servers by some customers has a positive externality on the other customers.
• Nash equilibrium is unique for arrival rates per server less than or equal to 1/ √ 2.
• Nash equilibrium is unique if and only if a local monotonicity condition is satisfied. This condition is used to explore the uniqueness numerically for arrival rates per server larger than 1/ √ 2.
• Multiple Nash equilibria exist for a particular example with arrival rates per server equal to 0.999. We also show that the mean field model arises naturally as the limit of supermarket game with finite number of servers:
• The joint equilibrium distribution of any fixed number of queues converges to a product distribution determined by the mean field model as the number of queues converge to infinity.
• A Nash equilibrium of the supermarket game in the mean field model is an -Nash equilibrium of the supermarket game for finite number of servers with the number of servers large enough.
C. Related Work
The supermarket game is formulated based on the classical supermarket model with N parallel queues in which customers sample a fixed number L of queues uniformly at random and join the shortest sampled queue. The supermarket model has been extensively studied in the literature [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] using the mean field approach. The recent paper by Bramson et. al. [6] analyzes the supermarket model with general service time distributions. Ganesh et. al. [7] studies a variant of the supermarket model, where the customers initially join an arbitrary server, but may switch to other servers later independently at random.
In addition to the supermarket model, the mean field approach has also been used to analyze scheduling in queueing networks, such as the CSMA algorithm in a wireless local area network [8] and downlink transmission scheduling [9] . Also, a recent work [10] investigates the performance tradeoff between centralized and distributed scheduling in a multiserver system for the mean field model. However, none of above work considers a game-theoretic framework.
The supermarket game proposed in this paper falls into a large research area involving equilibrium behavior of customers and servers, known as queueing games. A comprehensive survey can be found in [11] . A particularly relevant paper [12] studies a two line queueing system, where upon arrival each customer decides whether to purchase the information about which line is shorter, or randomly select one of the lines.
Finally, the supermarket game is also related to and partially motivated by the theory of mean field games in the context of dynamical games [13] , [14] . The mean field game approach studies a weakly coupled, N player game by letting N → ∞. However, we caution that in the supermarket game, we consider an infinite sequence of customers instead of finitely many customers, which is different from an N player game.
D. Organization of the Paper
Section II introduces the precise definition of the supermarket game to be studied and the key notations. The mean field model for the supermarket game is studied in Section III, and justified in Section IV. Section V ends the paper with concluding remarks. Due to space limitations, some of the proofs are sketched, or omitted; they can be found in [15] .
II. MODEL AND NOTATION

A. Model
Consider a supermarket game with N FCFS queues with exponential service rate one, and global Poisson arrival rate Nλ. Assume λ < 1 and let L = {1, . . . , L max }. Upon arrival, each customer chooses a number L ∈ L of queues to be sampled uniformly at random, and the customer joins the sampled queue with the least number of customers, ties being resolved uniformly at random. Customers are assumed to have cost c per unit waiting time and c s for sampling one queue. These cost parameters are the same for all the customers.
For a fixed customer i, if she chooses L i queues to sample, and all the other customers choose L −i , then by PASTA (Poisson arrival sees time average), the expected total cost of customer i is given by
where
is the expected waiting time (service time included) under the stationary distribution. The goal of customer i is to minimize her own expected total cost by choosing the optimal L i . Since the supermarket game is symmetric in the customers, we limit ourselves to symmetric strategies. We call L ∈ L a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, if
Since a pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not always exist, we are also interested in mixed strategy Nash equilibria.
Let P(L) denote the set of all probability distributions over L. The mixed strategy μ i for customer i is simply a probability distribution in P(L), i.e., μ i (L i ) is the probability that customer i samples L i queues. If all the other customers use the mixed strategy μ −i , then the expected total cost of customer i using μ i is given by
where C(L i , μ −i ) is the expected total cost of customer i choosing L i given all the others choose the mixed strategy μ −i . Define the best response correspondence for customer i as
In this paper, we are interested in characterizing the Nash equilibria of the supermarket game.
B. Notation
Let L (X) denote the law of a random variable X. Weak convergence of probability measures is denoted by =⇒. For
For x ∈ R, let x denote the maximum integer no larger than x.
III. SUPERMARKET GAME IN A MEAN FIELD MODEL
The supermarket game in a mean field model is studied in this section by investigating the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
A. Mean Field Model
In this subsection, we derive an expression for the expected total cost incurred by a customer in a mean field model, by assuming that queue lengths (including customers in service) are independent and identically distributed.
Suppose all the customers except customer i use the mixed strategy μ −i , and let r t (k) denote the fraction of queues with at least k customers at time t in the mean field model. Then, the mean field equation is given by
which is rigorously derived in [15] . For now, let us provide some intuition for each of the drift terms in (3):
is the probability that the minimum queue length of l uniformly sampled queues is k−1, which is the same as the probability that a customer who samples l queues joins a queue with k − 1 customers. Note that r t (k) is increased if a customer joins a queue with k − 1 customers. Therefore, the first term in (3) is the aggregate drift for r t (k) corresponding to arrivals.
The term (r t (k) − r t (k + 1)) corresponds to departures of customers at queues with exactly k customers.
Since we are interested in the stationary regime, set
where the random variable L is distributed as μ −i . By summing the above equation for k 0 ≤ k < +∞ using telescoping sums and changing k 0 to k, it follows that
. Because queues are independent in the mean field model,
where N (L i ) is the length of the shortest queue among the L i sampled queues. Therefore,
Since
Next, we prove two key lemmas which are useful in the sequel.
Lemma 1. The best response set BR(μ −i ) consists of probability measures concentrated on an integer or two consecutive integers.
Proof:
which contradicts the fact that C(L, μ −i ) is strictly convex in L and thus the conclusion follows.
Remark 1. Lemma 1 implies that a probability measure μ ∈ BR(μ −i ) can be identified with a unique real number
L ∈ [1, L max ]. A number L ∈ [1, L max ] with L = L + p for some 0 ≤ p < 1
is identified with the probability measure with mass 1 − p at L and p at L + 1. Thus, we use real numbers to refer to probability measures in BR(μ −i ).
The next lemma translates the stochastic dominance relations between strategies into the stochastic dominance relations between mean field equilibrium distributions.
Lemma 2. Fix any μ
1 , μ 2 ∈ P(L) such that μ 1 ≤ st μ 2 . Then, for all k ∈ N, r μ1 (k) ≥ r μ2 (k). Furthermore, if μ 1 < st μ 2 , then for all k ≥ 2, r μ1 (k) > r μ2 (k). Also,
it follows that for all k ∈ N and all μ ∈ P(L), r μ (k) ≤ λ k and C(L, μ) is bounded independently of L and μ.
Proof: Since μ 1 ≤ st μ 2 , it follows that for all x ∈ [0, 1], u μ1 (x) ≥ u μ2 (x). We prove the lemma by induction. If k = 0, then r μ1 (0) = r μ2 (0) = 1 and r μ1 (0) ≥ r μ2 (0) trivially holds.
B. Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium
In this subsection, we show the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. It is easy to see that if there exists μ such that μ ∈ BR(μ ), i.e., μ is a fixed point of the best response correspondence, then μ is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Thus, it suffices to show the existence of such a fixed point. The Kakutani fixed point theorem is used to prove it [15] . 
Intuitively, V (L i , μ −i ) characterizes the reduction of expected waiting time when customer i increases the number of sampled queues from L i to L i + 1. For ease of notation, define
The following lemma characterizes the best response using V (L i , μ −i ).
Lemma 3. Fix any μ
The next lemma proves a global monotonicity property of
, which is useful for showing the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in that case.
we prove a stronger conclusion, that is, for k ≥ 2,
Indeed, by Lemma 2, for k ≥ 2,
Lemma 4 implies that for λ 2 ≤ 1/2, a customer tends to sample fewer queues when all the other customers sample more queues. This is an instance of avoid the crowd behavior [11] , leading to uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Without loss of generality, suppose L <L ; by Lemma 4, L ≥L , which is a contradiction and concludes the proof.
refers to a probability distribution here) for all λ < 1. By numerical results, we find that when λ = 0.99 and
This implies that sometimes a customer tends to sample more queues when all the others sample more queues. This follow the crowd behavior can lead to multiple Nash equilibria. Such a scenario is described in the sequel.
Next, we introduce a local monotonicity condition and show the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium for all values of c and c s if and only if the local monotonicity condition is satisfied. . . , 24 are pure strategy Nash equilibria and mixed strategy Nash equilibria exist between each two consecutive pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Numerical results show that when
λ = 0.99, V (L, L + q) is indeed strictly decreasing with respect to 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 for L = 1, . . . , 9. For L ≥ 10, r L+q (2) ≤ r L (2) ≤ r 10 (2) ≤ L/(L + 1), which implies that V (L, L + q) is strictly decreasing over 0 ≤ q ≤ 1,
C. Externality
The action of sampling more queues by some customers has an effect on the waiting time of others. This effect is called the externality associated with the action and the externality is positive if the action reduces the mean waiting time of the other customers. In this subsection, the externality in the mean field model is analyzed. It is not clear whether the externality is positive at first sight. On one hand, choosing a large number of queues to sample helps a customer find a less loaded queue and hence reduces future arrivals' opportunity to find lightly loaded queues. On the other hand, it also leads to a well balanced system and reduces the average waiting time.
The following corollary of Lemma 2 implies that the action of sampling more queues by some customers has a positive externality on the other customers in the mean field model. To see it, suppose in system 1, all the customers adopt a strategy μ 1 ; while in system 2, a fraction 0 < p ≤ 1 of them samples more queues, i.e., adopts a new strategy μ 3 with μ 1 < st μ 3 and all the others still adopt the strategy μ 1 . For system 2, it is equivalent to assume that all the customers adopt a strategy μ 2 with μ 2 = pμ 3 + (1 − p)μ 1 . It follows that μ 1 < st μ 2 . By Corollary 1, system 2 has smaller mean waiting time.
Proof: Because μ 1 < st μ 2 , by Lemma 2, r μ1 (k) > r μ2 (k), ∀k ≥ 2. Hence, the conclusion follows by invoking
Remark 2. Corollary 1 further implies that customers sample no more queues for any Nash equilibrium than for the socially optimal strategy. See [15] for the details.
IV. JUSTIFICATION OF MEAN FIELD MODEL
In this section, we justify the mean field model as the limit of the supermarket game with finite N as N → ∞.
denote customer i's waiting time and total average cost for N queues. Then, the expected waiting time can be derived as
where Q (N ) (i) is the length of the ith sampled queue in equilibrium.
The following theorem shows that the mean field model corresponds to the limit as N → ∞.
Theorem 4. Let Z denote the random variable associated with the mean field equilibrium distribution
Remark 3. The proof of Theorem 4 is based on the idea of propagation of chaos [16] , [3] . See [15] for the full proof.
Next, the definition of -Nash equilibrium in the finite N model is introduced. Proof: By the coupling result given in [15] , [2] , it follows that W (N ) (L i , μ −i ) is uniformly integrable. In view of Theorem 4, it follows that for each > 0, there exists N 0 ∈ N such that when N ≥ N 0 ,
and thus
where W (L i , μ −i ) and C(μ, μ −i ) are the waiting time and total average cost respectively in the mean field model. Then using the definition of μ , the conclusion follows easily.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Our results indicate that the equilibrium picture for the supermarket game can be somewhat complicated, at least if 0.5 < λ 2 < 1. In particular, there may be multiple Nash equilibria, stemming from the fact that customers do not always have an "avoid the crowd" response as when λ 2 ≤ 0.5. However, this complication seems to occur only for λ close to one and L max fairly large. Also, at least in the mean field limit model, the positive externality of increased sampling holds for the whole range λ < 1. For the finite N model, the coupling result in [2] shows that sampling more queues by some customers has a positive externality on customers who only sample one queue. However, for customers who sample more than one queue, the samplings of more queues by other customers can have a negative externality [15] .
